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Teacher and school board negotiators will soon begin their second
year of bargaining under Indiana's first public employee collective bar-
gaining law.' The first year under any collective bargaining law seldom
goes smoothly, and teacher-school board negotiations in Indiana in 1974
were no exception.' Although bargaining was mandated to begin by
the second week of February,8 many districts did not begin bargaining
until about mid-April' because of the backlog of unit determination and
representation cases.5
* A.B. 1970, Stanford University; J.D. 1973, Indiana University; Member of the
Indiana Bar; Director of Legal Services, Indiana School Boards Association. Mr. Rund
has represented the ISBA in matters before the Indiana Education Employment Rela-
tions Board.
'Public Law No. 217, [1973] Ind. Acts 1080, IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-1 to -14 (1973),
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 284551 to -4564 (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Public Law
217 or the Act].
2 Taking as standard the common practice of commencing the school year on the day
following Labor Day-a rule generally though not universally followed in Indiana-there
were 46 schools which opened the fall term before final agreements were reached. Of
the 276 school districts with certified exclusive representatives, 137 required neutral in-
tervention (mediation, fact-finding, or both) in the first year. See Doering, Bargaining
and Discussion: Is It a Happy MarriageF, 50 IND. L.J. 284, 289 (1975), supra.
3 Under section 12 of the Act, table bargaining is mandated to begin on or before
180 days prior to the school corporation's budget submission date. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-
12 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4562 (Supp. 1974). This would have been February 12,
1974, in most corporations.
4 See Doering, supra note 2, at 289.
1 One hundred and one unit representation disputes required Board assistance, and
53 formal hearings had to be held in 1974. The Board conducted secret ballot elections
in 17 school corporations, and, although run-off elections are not specifically provided for
in the Act, three were held in 1974. 1 IEERB ANNUAL REP. - (1975).
Prior to the effective date of the Act many Indiana schools did not have an exclusive
representative (a school employee organization representing a majority of the certificated
employees in an appropriate unit for the purpose of collective bargaining). The start
of bargaining was delayed in school corporations where there was no teacher organiza-
tion authorized by a majority of the teachers to represent them in bargaining or where
there were competing teacher organizations.
Some teacher organization officers requested school boards to recognize them on the
basis of teacher membership lists. These requests were almost universally denied because
majority authorization, not membership, is required before a school employer may recog-
nize a school employee organization as the exclusive representative. An individual
teacher could belong to more than one school employee organization, or could belong to
a particular organization without wanting or designating that organization to represent
him at the bargaining table.
This practice forced teacher organizations to collect authorization cards, or circulate
petitions which indicated that the teacher had authorized a particular school employee
organization to represent him for the purpose of collective bargaining. Where there were
competing organizations seeking recognition, most school employers declined to grant
recognition and petitioned the Board pursuant to section 10(c) (2) of the Act that one
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Despite the delay at the beginning of the bargaining process, how-
ever, negotiations went remarkably well considering the unfamiliarity
of both school boards and teachers with collective bargaining,6 the
or more school employee organizations had presented to it a claim to be recognized as
the exclusive representative in the appropriate unit. The Board is authorized to investi-
gate such a petition pursuant to section 10(c) (4), and if it ha; reasonable cause to be-
lieve a question exists as to whether any organization represents a majority, it must hold
a hearing to determine whether a question of representation in fact exists. If a question
of representation is found, the Board must direct a secret ballot election.
Even where an employee organization offered authorization cards showing majority
support, some employers preferred to petition the IEERB for an election rather than
voluntarily recognize the teacher organization as the exclusive representative. By calling
for an election, school boards would have the advantage of the 24-month election bar
rule, which provides that there shall be no representation chalknges for 24 months fol-
lowing an IEERB-conducted balloting. Also, it was believed that the secret ballot
method of selecting the exclusive representative would discou -age pressure tactics by
competing teacher organizations seeking authorizations. In this regard cf. Linden Lum-
ber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 95 S. Ct. 429 (Dec. 23, 1974), holding that it was
not an unfair practice for an employer to refuse to bargain with an employee represen-
tative whose proof of being majority representative was based solely on authorization
cards. The employer had committed no unfair practice durin g the employee organiza-
tion's solicitation campaign, unlike the cases decided previously by the Supreme Court,
so that the question was simply whether the employer could refuse to acknowledge ma-
jority status on the basis of signed authorization cards and could refuse to call for an
election himself. Held, it was incumbent on the union to petitiorn the NLRB for an elec-
tion. Id. at 434. The Court, while noting that this position "is rot to say that authoriza-
tion cards are wholly unreliable as an indication of employee support for a union,"
pointed out that "[a]n employer concededly may have valid objections to recognizing a
union on that basis." Id. at 432. The employer might believe, the Court observed, that
the individual employees' participation in joint action under the direction of the union-
in most instances satisfactory evidence of support for that union-might instead be mo-
tivated by fear of noncompliance or mere sympathy for other participating employees,
and not "that they desire the particular union as their representative." Id.
Although school employer refusal to recognize on the ba3is of membership lists,
authorization cards, or petitions may have delayed the start of brgaining in some school
corporations, secret ballot elections remain the superior method of choosing the school
employee organization which is to represent teachers in bargaining. Many teachers had
signed authorization cards or petitions for more than one orgz.nization; moreover, the
school boards did not relish the task of verifying individual signatures on the cards or
petitions. And of course, there could be no recognition or election until the appropriate
bargaining unit was determined either by agreement with a school employee organization
representing 20 percent or more of the employees in the proposed unit, or by IEERB de-
cision. For a discussion of the difficulties many school corporations experienced in de-
termining the bargaining unit, see notes 12-13 infra & text accompanying.
8 Relatively few school boards or teachers' organizations had formal bargaining ex-
perience prior to the passage of the Act in 1973.
Prior to 1972, in some 10% of all districts, negotiations resulted in master
agreements; in 53%, negotiations led to agreements which were effectuated
through school board adoption; in 33%, teachers made proposals but did not
enter into formal negotiations; and in 4%, no negotiations vere attempted.
Note, Determining the Scope of Bargaining Under the Indiana Education Employment
Relations Act, 49 IND. L.J. 460, 466 n.32 (1974), citing E. Bowe3, The Development and
Utilization of a Classification System for Describing the Status of Teacher Group-School
Board Negotiations in Indiana, Sept. 1971 (unpublished disserta .ion in the Indiana Uni-
versity Library).
Despite the lack of experience of the parties, there is reason to be pleased with the
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difficulty experienced by the parties and the Indiana Education Employ-
ment Relations Board (hereinafter referred to as the IEERB or the
Board) in interpreting certain vague or ambiguous provisions of the
Act, and the heavy burden placed on the IEERB staff by teacher and
board requests for unit determination, representation, and unfair labor
practice hearings and requests for mediation and fact-finding.7 There
were no strikes in Indiana in 1974, and all school corporations in which
the teachers selected a certified exclusive representative reached
settlement prior to the date mandated for beginning the bargaining
process in 1975.8
Because the 99th Indiana General Assembly is now considering
amendments to Public Law 217' as well as legislation extending manda-
tory collective bargaining to other public employees,"0 an analysis of
the first round of bargaining under the Act is instructive.
DELAYS IN BARGAINING
Once the parties reached the bargaining table the two niost heated
progress of the first year of negotiations. In his "State of the State" address, Governor
Otis Bowen stated:
The relative ease with which Indiana completed its first-ever round of educa-
tional collective bargaining is directly attributable to the basic soundness of the
legislation enacted by this body, the high quality of work rendered by the In-
diana Education Employment Relations Board, and by the professional nature
of Indiana's teachers and school administrators.
Address by Gov. Otis R. Bowen Before the 99th Indiana General Assembly, Joint Ses-
sion, House Chambers, Jan. 9, 1975; Transcript at 21-22 (emphasis in original).
7 See Doering, supra note 2, at 289.
There is some evidence that third-party intervention was requested in some cases
more out of curiosity than necessity. For example, on May 24, 1974 the IEERB received
a letter from the president of a local teachers association informing the Board that "we
will be at impasse on May 28, 1974." (Letter on file with the IEERB, read by Chairman
DeWald at the IEERB meeting June 13, 1974.)
8 Of all the school corporations with certified exclusive representatives, the last two
districts to ratify the negotiated agreements-Pike County and Randolph Central-did so
on December 23, 1974. Jennings County, while ratifying five days earlier, was actually
the last school corporation to reach settlement at the bargaining table.
9 For example, of bills still in committee, three would modify existing provisions of
Public Law 217 regarding teacher bargaining: House Bill 1432 would install open-scope
bargaining and would repeal the no-strike and no-deficit-financing provisions of the pres-
ent law. Senate Bill 276 would permit the negotiating of an agency shop provision, and
Senate Bill 274 would require binding arbitration of the contract's terms if the parties
were unable to reach accord by two weeks prior to the school corporation's budget sub-
mission date.
10 House Bill 1298, as amended, mandates open-scope bargaining for all public em-
ployees except police and fire department employees, professional engineers, and faculty
at institutions of higher education and public schools. Agency shop would be mandatory
if requested by the employee organization; union shop would be a permissive subject of
bargaining. This bill was passed by the House on January 28, 1975, and was sent to the
Serate. JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE, 99th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. 145-46 (1975).
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subjects of contention were the economic items and the determination
of what items beyond these were mandatory subjects of bargaining.
Yet the start of bargaining in nearly one-third of Indiana's schools
was delayed by disputes over unit determinations and representation so
that very little time was left for bargaining over the substantive terms
of the contract prior to the budget submission deadline.'1
Most of the representation disputes involved the questions of
whether department heads or coaches were "supervisors" within the
meaning of section 2 (h) of the Act,12 and whether deans and guidance
counsellors were "confidential employees" within the meaning of section
2(i) of the Act. 3 Because the basis for inclusion in or exclusion from
the bargaining unit is the employee's actual job function, not the nominal
title given his position, the IEERB was forced to make case-by-case
appraisals requiring the taking of evidence at lengthy hearings.
Spiraling inflation, however, which sharply incrcased school corpora-
tion costs and reduced the purchasing power of teachers' paychecks in
1974, was probably the most important single factor contributing to
the difficulties many school corporations experienced in reaching a set-
tlement. To make matters even worse for Indiana'3 public schools, the
General Assembly froze property tax levies in the same year it enacted
"In one-third of these districts, bargaining was delayed cven past the date man-
dated by statute for bargaining to begin.
12 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(h) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(h) (Supp. 1974).
The statutory provisions relating to "supervisors" are set forth in Doering, supra note 2,
at 298 n.66.
is Both school boards and teachers took a firm stand on the raakeup of the bargaining
unit. Reluctance to compromise on the appropriate bargaining tnit by teacher organiza-
tions can be explained in economic as well as structural terms. Exclusion of department
heads, coaches, deans, and guidance counselors from the bargaining unit meant the loss
of hundreds of dues-paying members statewide. Yet it is probable that the exclusion
from the unit of many local teacher organization officers who held one of the disputed
positions was a cause for even greater alarm. Active, expericnced teachers are often
promoted to the position of department head or dean, and thus a high percentage of the
local teacher organization's leaders would hold one of these positions.
School boards took a hard line on the composition of th,." bargaining unit for a
variety of reasons. In large and middle-sized school corporations, the primary reason
for seeking the exclusion of certain positions from the unit was one of managerial neces-
sity; many smaller school corporations, on the other hand, sought to exclude certain po-
sitions from the unit under the mistaken assumption that this Y, as a good in and of it-
self. This misconception can probably be traced to advice given at a series of negotia-
tion seminars attended by school administrators in the autumr of 1973. Participants
were told to try to exclude everyone possible from the unit. The underlying assumption
of the advice-that the teachers would give up some of their oter demands in exchange
for an agreement by the board to modify the unit to include previously excluded posi-
tions-was not universally grasped. It is probable that school employers will consent to
a modification of the unit in the future to include previously excluded positions should




Public Law 217.14 Despite certain positive aspects of this legislation for
homeowners with limited incomes, the property tax freeze has made it
doubly difficult for school corporations to respond to teacher salary
demands. 5
Because school corporations are no longer able to raise additional
revenues at the local level, school boards will join with teachers and
administrators this year in seeking financial relief for the public schools
from the legislature. Cooperation between the two groups, however,
will unfortunately be limited to the question of additional state support
for the public schools. The teachers and school boards are sharply
divided over what the scope of bargaining should be. Some teacher
organizations are seeking to broaden the mandatory scope of bargaining
under Public Law 217, while the Indiana School Boards Association
and school administrator organizations are opposing any changes in
the present scope.
SCOPE OF BARGAINING
Before enacting any new public employee collective bargaining
legislation, or amending Public Law 217, Indiana legislators and citizens
need to understand why most Indiana school boards rejected teacher
demands that the scope of bargaining be broadened; in addition, they
should understand how the fundamental right to self-government is
involved in the scope of bargaining controversy.
In section 1 (d) of the Act, the General Assembly eloquently stated
its determination that public school bargaining is inherently different
from private sector bargaining:
The relationship between school corporation employers and
certificated school employees is not comparable to the relation
between private employers and employees among others for
the following reasons: (i) a public school corporation is not
operated for profit but to insure the citizens of the State rights
guaranteed them by the Indiana State Constitution; (ii) the obliga-
tion to educate children and the methods by which such education
is effected will change rapidly with increasing technology, the needs
14 Public Law No. 45, [1973] Ind. Acts 175, IND. AN. STAT. §§ 6-1-67-1 to -8 (Code
ed. Supp. 1974).
35 This law freezes the amount a school corporation may raise by property taxes at
the amount that would have been raised in 1973 assuming 100% collection, unless in-
creased or decreased due to special circumstances existing in the school district. Because
the dollar levy and not the tax rate is frozen, an increase in school corporation assessed
valuation has no effect on the school corporation's ability to raise additional revenues.
Thus, rising land values no longer serve as a counterbalance to increases in school cor-
poration costs attributable to inflation.
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of an advancing civilization and requirements for substantial
educational innovation; (iii) the Indiana General Assembly has
delegated the discretion to carry out this changing and innovative
educational function to the local governing bodies of school cor-
porations, composed of citizens elected or appointed under applic-
able law, a delegation which these bodies may not and should not
bargain away; and (iv) public school corporations have different
obligations with respect to certificated school employees under
constitutional and statutory requirements than private employers
have to their employees.1 6
Nor is section 1 (d) the only evidence of the legislature's desire to
narrowly define the scope of bargaining under Public Law 217. Sec-
tions 317 and 6(b)'8 reserve to the school employcr certain rights with
which the collective bargaining agreement may not "conflict." And
section 410 limits the mandatory subjects of bargaining to "salary, wages,
hours, and salary and wage related fringe benefits."
Even if these sections were the only provisions of Public Law 217
relating to scope of bargaining, the task of the IEERB in determining
what subjects of bargaining are mandatory and what illegal still would
not be an easy one. But the Board's task is further complicated by the
following features of the Act: the section 5 grandfather proviso which
makes items included in 1972-1973 agreements between school corpora-
tions and school employee organizations subject to mandatory bargain-
ing even though they do not fall within the subjects enumerated in sec-
tion 4 ;2O the peculiar use of permissive bargaining language with respect
16 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-1(d) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4551(d) (Supp. 1974).
17 Section 3 of the Act, IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-3 (1973), I1D. ANx. STAT. § 28-4553
(Supp. 1974), provides: "No contract may include provisions ir conflict with . . . school
employer rights as defined in Section 6(b) of this chapter." See [1974] Ind. Acts 3.
18 Section 6(b) of the Act gives a listing of reserved manogerial rights saved to the
school corporation's discretion, including but not limited to the right to:
(1) direct the work of its employees;
(2) establish policy;
(3) hire, promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain employees;
(4) suspend or discharge its employees in accordance with applicable law;
(5) maintain the efficiency of school operations;
(6) relieve its employees from duties because of lack of work or other
legitimate reason;
(7) take actions necessary to carry out the mission of the public schools as
provided by law.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-6(b) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4556(b) (Supp. 1974).
19 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STA4T. § 28-45E4 (Supp. 1974).
20 Section 4 of the Act provides:
A school employer shall bargain collectively with the exclusive representative
on the following: salary, wages, hours, and salary and wage related fringe
benefits. A contract may also contain a grievance procedure culminating in
final and binding arbitration of unresolved grievances, but such binding arbitra-
1975]
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to grievance procedures which are listed among the otherwise mandatory
subjects of bargaining in section 4;21 and the language in section 5
permitting, though not mandating, bargaining over all subjects which
the school employer is obligated to discuss with the teachers' exclusive
representative.
Public Law 217 is more a patchwork of competing values than a
carefully woven fabric of uniform texture and design. Teacher organiza-
tions and school boards argued over which patches in the quilt were the
most significant, but the unenviable task of interpreting legislative
intent and-where none could be dearly found-of weighing competing
interests and values was left to the IEERB and its staff.
The reluctance of most Indiana school boards to negotiate on sub-
jects other than those they believed to be mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining does not originate from any attempt to stifle the bargaining
process. As one commentator has recently stated: "To the extent that
collective bargaining supplants the voters' control over government
decisions, the ability of the community to influence its representatives
is diluted."22 Stated another way: Should educational policy be deter-
mined in teacher-school board negotiations where concessions-a neces-
sary part of good faith bargaining-must be made to but one of the many
interest groups the school board is supposed to represent? Board policy
adopted after careful consideration can be readily changed if it becomes
evident that the policy is not in the best interests of the students or the
community; a negotiated contract cannot. And, more basically, what is
in the best interest of the students and the community is not always
in the best interest of the teachers.
THE DIscussIoN PROCESS
The discussion mechanism in the Act23 provides the teachers with
tion shall have no power to amend, add to, subtract from or supplement provi-
sions of the contract.
IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-4 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 284554 (Supp. 1974).
21 Id. See Note, supra note 6, at 462 n.16. But see Marion Teachers Ass'n & Marion
Community Schools, Bd. of School Trustees, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-44-2865
(IEERB, Nov. 4, 1974). Cf. note 49 infra.
22 Note, supra note 6, at 461.
23 Section 3 of the Act mandates the "right and obligation to discuss any item set
forth in Section 5 . . ." while section 5 enumerates a fairly inclusive group of conditions
of employment and matters of professional concern. IND. CODE §§ 20-7.5-1-3, -5 (1973),
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 28-4553, -4555 (Supp. 1974). The mechanics of discussion required
by section 2(o) of the Act are that the "superintendent and the exclusive representative
[shall] meet at reasonable times to discuss, to provide meaningful input, to exchange
points of view," with respect to the section 5 items. IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(o) (1973),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(o) (Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 50:344
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a means for supplying input into decisions which legitimately concern
them, but which are of overriding concern to the students or the com-
munity at large. The Indiana School Boards Association repeatedly
urged its members during the past year to establish discussion teams
separate from their bargaining teams to discuss matters outside the
scope of bargaining. The Association staff recommended that the school
superintendent head the discussion team since in a . chool corporation he
has the primary responsibility for developing and recommending educa-
tional programs and policies to the school board. While a few school
administrators expressed satisfaction with the discussion process, many
reported that teacher representatives were either unwilling to engage
in discussion outside of the bargaining process, or attempted to turn
the discussion session into full bargaining.
The IEERB Position
The IEERB has attached great weight to the discussion require-
ments of the Act and has resolved some important disputes over whether
an item is a mandatory subject of bargaining by holding the disputed
item to be a section 5 working condition which must be discussed if
the exclusive representative so desires, and which may, but need not,
be bargained. The Board's refusal to find that the Fairfield Community
Schools had committed an unfair labor practice24 by deciding not to
bargain the school calendar25 after it had indicated a willingness to dis-
cuss the issue is an excellent illustration of the Board's policy of en-
forcing the discussion mandate on subjects it determines to be outside the
scope of mandatory bargaining.
The Fairfield opinion stated:
The hearing examiner takes notice of the fact that the
General Assembly has provided in Public Law #217 a discussion
mechanism which is a required alternatve procedure to bargaining
24 John Rouch v. Board of School Trustees of the Fairfield Community Schools,
[Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-7-2155 (IEERB, submitted Sept. 10, 1974, adopted
Nov. 22, 1974).
25 The case dealt with the refusal of the school board to bargain, despite the teacher
association's insistence, over a number of scheduling decision. , which, when taken to-
gether, are generally referred to as the "school calendar." These issues included:
(1) The starting date of the teacher's employment;
(2) The ending date of the teacher's employment;
(3) The starting date of unpaid vacations, breaks, or rece, ses;
(4) The ending date of unpaid vacations, breaks, or rece 3es;
(5) The length of any unpaid vacation, break, or recess;
(6) A contract term to the effect that no part of the school calendar would be
changed by the school employer without first bargaining such a change with teachers'
exclusive representative. Id. at 4-5.
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in order to cope with issues in which the school employee has a
vital interest but which by their nature are best dealt with away
from the crisis, compromise, and time deadlines of the collective
bargaining process. The requirement of Sec. 2 that discussion must
consist of "meaningful input" provides a viable forum for the con-
sideration of the school employee's interest. The duty to discuss
provides the school employer the flexibility to avoid the problems
that respondent's counsel contends would arise as a result of chedu-
ling employment by the process of collective bargaining. The pro-
cedure of discussion also allows input from other groups in addition
to school employees who also have a direct interest in the adoption
of the school schedule. Based upon the above reasons, the legisla-
tive intent stated in Sec. 1, and the sui generis nature of Public Law
#217, the hearing examiner concludes that the disputed items in
this case are subjects of discussion in that such items are "working
conditions other than those provided in Section 4."-26
The School Board's Position
The brief for the respondent Fairfield Community Schools, referred
to in the opinion above, lucidly demonstrated why the school calendar
could best be dealt with "away from the crisis, compromise, and time
deadlines of the collective bargaining process."
[T]he school calendar greatly affects many other individuals and
public interests other than that of teachers. First, there are the
other employees of the school system: Fairfield Schools reflect
this situation in that there are 72 teachers in the bargaining unit,
75 employees outside the bargaining unit and 1600 students.
Obviously, the aspects of the school calendar in dispute are of as
much concern to the secretaries, cooks, aides, custodians, bus drivers,
and administrators as they are to the teachers. Where these other
school employees do negotiate-and it is not a wild speculation that
they, too, may be protected very soon by collective bargaining
legislation-they most certainly want to have a voice in these
matters of when they start to work, break for vacations, and dis-
continue their services for the year.
Moreover, the school calendar impinges upon other com-
munity interests: There are, after all, 1600 students involved in
the Fairfield Schools compared to 72 teachers in the bargaining
unit, and the multiplier effect of their families illustrates that a
sizable portion of the total community is directly affected by the
setting of the school calendar. There is great public pressure on
the School Board to adopt a calendar by February of the previous
year, since so many community decisions revolve around the school
calendar. You cannot overlook the economic child care functions
of the school system by foolishly thinking that the calendar is a
2 Id. at 10-11.
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matter of prime concern to the teacher. In a time when women are
working increasingly, the school schedule becones a matter of
important economic interest to many families in the community.
As if the interests of the other employees, the students, the
patrons, and the community were not enough, Fairfield, and it is
typical, must coordinate its calendar with other school systems.
Fairfield is in a Vocational Cooperative School project involving
50 of its students, with the school systems of the City of Elkhart,
West Noble, and Lakeland (Syracuse). Further, Fairfield is part
of a joint Special Education project with seven school systems
of Elkhart County, and must also coordinate its calendar to ac-
commodate the special program which it alone could not afford
to offer the boys and girls who need this special education.
The calendar must also be set at an early date so that numerous
school-related activities may be scheduled and planned in advance,
such as athletic events, physical examinations znd the letting of
contracts.
The IEERB should be mindful, in deciding this issue, that
the teachers do have a protected right under Public Law 217 to
have substantial input into the non-negotiable aspects of the
school calendar through the discussion process. The School
Board does not deny that teachers have an interest in these non-
negotiable aspects of the school calendar and Fairfield, in fact, did
discuss these matters with the exclusive representative.7
Moreover, the respondent school corporation pointed out that an
impasse over the school calendar might create a "no-strike" strike since
there can be no formal strike if the opening day of school has not been
set.2 8 The school corporation concluded in its brief, "Surely the legis-
lature did not mean to say that only the teachers should have input into
this important community decision [on the school calendar] .' 29
At its meeting of October 31, the IEERB ruled that its decision in
the Fairfield case should be expressly considered as a precedent in other
similar cases, and it held that "[d]aily hours and the total number of
days to be worked are negotiable items for collective bargaining. All
other calendar items are discussable."8
27 Brief for Respondent at 4-5 (brief and decision on fil, with the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL).
28Id. at'3. Strikes are expressly forbidden by section 14 o- the Act, IND. CODE § 20-
7.5-1-14 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4564 (Supp. 1974). The term "strike" is broadly
defined to include virtually all disruptive and peaceful concerted work actions. Id. §
2(p), IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-2(p) (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4552(p) (Supp. 1974).
29 Brief for Respondent at 5 (emphasis in original).





A major stumbling block to bargaining in many Indiana school
corporations was the teacher organization's refusal to begin bargaining
on items which both parties agreed were bargainable, unless the school
board would first agree to negotiate items the board believed to be
outside the scope of bargaining. In the Huntington case' the Board
found that the school employee organization had committeed an unfair
labor practice by refusing to enter into a collective bargaining agreement
on section 4 items unless the school board first agreed to negotiate
teacher preparation or planning time, a subject which the IEERB held
to be discussible under section 582 as a "working condition, other than
those provided in Section 4."'"s
The Huntington decision is significant for several reasons. It was
the first case in which teachers were found to have committed an unfair
practice in refusing to negotiate in good faith, a finding with added
significance since the practice found to be unfair was common among
many teacher negotiators. The Board held that it was an unfair labor
practice in violation of section 7(b) (3)84 and section 7(b) (4) 8 of the
Act
for a school employee organization or its agents to insist to impasse
any item not a subject of mandated collective bargaining or to insist
upon the resolution of any issue concerning such non-mandated
bargaining items as a condition for agreement upon any mandated
bargaining item.8
Second, the IEERB held that
Public Law #217 (Acts 1973) does not establish the mutual obliga-
tion to bargain collectively for the school employer and the exclu-
sive representative an assigned period of time during the regular
school day or week for the purpose of preparation and planning by
81 Huntington County Community School Corp. v. Huntington Community Class-
room Teachers Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-34-3625 (IEERB, Sept. 23,
1974).
821d. at 7-8.$3 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4555 (Supp. 1974).
84 "It shall be an unfair practice for a school employee organization or its agents to:
• . . (3) refuse to bargain collectively with a school employer, if the school employee
organization is the exclusive representative . . . ." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-7(b) (3) (1973),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4557(b) (3) (Supp. 1974).
85 "It shall be an unfair practice for a school employee organization or its agents to:
(4) fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter." IND. CODE § 20-
7.5-1-7(b) (4) (1973), InD. ANN. STAT. § 28-4557(b) (4) (Supp. 1974).
86 Huntington County Community School Corp. v. Huntington Community Class-
room Teachers Ass'n, [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-34-3625 (IEERB, Sept. 23,
1974), at 7.
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the teacher of lessons, lectures, teaching material and aids, and for
the preparation of other general records and materials exclusive of
the unassigned duty time that is guaranteed by IC 1971 20-6-19-1."
Finally, the Board adopted a commonsense definition of "hours"3 and
rejected the teachers' contention that the term included the manner in
which the teacher spends his hours during the workday.
The Board did hold, however, that it was not an unfair practice
for either the school employer or a school employee organization "to
propose an item which is a permissive subject of bargaining," to demand
that permissive items be bargained (though not as a precondition to
bargaining on mandated items), or to insist upon "'the resolution of an
issue concerning a permissive subject as Quid Pro Quo for a com-
promise on a mandated bargaining item."3 The Board, by this holding,
has not discouraged good faith bargaining on permissive subjects of
negotiation.
The Mechanics of Discussion
Certainly, many issues important to teachers are not within the
mandated subjects of bargaining under Public Law 217. Most of these
items, however, must be discussed in a meaningful way. What is the
discussion obligation of a school board, though? In the Tippecanoe
case,10 the Board set out some guidelines on discussion and made clear
its position that whatever "discussion" is, it involves more than merely
sitting and listening to the teachers and then taking unilateral action."'
The hearing examiner explained:
Regardless of what is done with agreements reached in dis-
cussion, the obligation under P.L. 217 contemplates more than the
raising of problems. Sec. 2 (o), the definition of the word "dis-
cuss", indicates that the parties are mutually obligated " . to
provide meaningful input, to exchange points of view. .. " While
the parties are not required to agree to a proposal or make con-
cessions, meaningful input is more than just listening and taking
unilateral actions. "Input" refers to the discussion process; each
side is required to put something in to it.42
The decision went on to say that the teachers' association should be
37 Id.
38 Id. at 6.
so Id. at 5.
40 Bobbe June Blom v. Tippecanoe School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-
15-7865 (IEERB, July 5, 1974).
41 For further discussion on this point, see Doering, siepra note 2, at 292-94.
42 Tippecanoe at 10.
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given an opportunity to state its position on the proposed calendar
before adoption by the school board, but held that discussible items may
not be used as a pretext by either party to refuse to bargain over man-
dated subjects of bargaining. 3
The discussion procedure, while a valuable alternative to bargain-
ing, also has its limits. The legislature set up the discussion process as
an alternative method of resolving differences over issues of common
concern to both teachers and school boards where the issues would be
of overriding concern to the community as a whole. The extension of
the discussion mandate in the Baugo" and Delphi" cases to include
individual personnel decisions is unwarranted in light of the availability
of traditional grievance procedures.4 Section 4 of the Act appears to
authorize the inclusion of a grievance procedure in the master contract, 7
and all fact-finders considering this question have so held."8 Were this
not so, the negotiated grievance procedure would be wholly superfluous. 49
THE "GRANDFATHER CLAUSE"
In addition to the carefully drawn discussion mandate in the Act
481d. at 9-10.
44 Consolidated cases Sarah Borgman & Board of School Trustees of the Baugo
Community School Corp., Sharon Poyser & Board of School Trustees of the Baugo Com-
munity School Corp., [Unfair Practice] Cause No. U-74-11-2260-12; Donald Bacher &
Board of School Trustees of the Baugo Community School Corp., [Unfair Practice]
Cause No. U-74-11-2260-11 (IEERB, Sept. 5, 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Baugo].
45 Robert Brothers & Board of School Trustees of the Delphi Community School
Corp., [Unfair Practice] Case No. U-74-17-0755 (IEERB, Aug. 21, 1974).
48 Another issue in the Baugo and Delphi cases is the remedy selected. To remedy
the violation of the discussion mandate, the hearing examiners ordered the teachers who
had not been offered renewal contracts to be reinstated. This remedy may be beyond the
Board's power to invoke. While the National Labor Relations Act, section 10(c), 29
U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970) grants the NLRB the power to order reinstatement and back
wages, Public Law 217, section 11 merely states: "The board, but not a hearing ex-
aminer or agent thereof, may enter such interlocutory orders after summary hearing as
it deems necessary in carrying out the intent of this chapter." IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-11
(1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-4561 (Supp. 1974). But see Doering, supra note 2, at
296-97 & n.62.
47 The text of section 4 is quoted at note 20 supra.
48 See Doering, mupra note 2, at 300-01.
49 If section 5 does encompass the obligation to discuss individual personnel decisions,
it seems odd that section 4 expressly provides that contracts may contain a grievance
procedure, the traditional method for resolving disputes over personnel decisions affect-
ing individual employees. Yet the hearing examiner in Delphi concluded that the school
corporation had committed an unfair practice by refusing to discuss with the teacher
organization the promotion of a particular teacher to tenure, and by refusing to discuss
with that teacher and the employee organization his teaching methods, assignment to
middle school, the maintenance of student discipline, and the size of the band classes. In
Baugo, a similar refusal to discuss assignment, rehiring, teaching methods and student
discipline problems of individual teachers was found to be an unfair practice. An appeal
from these interpretations has been taken to the full Board, and oral argument was heard
on January 23, 1975. A decision is expected shortly. See Doering, supra note 2, at 294-97.
[Vol. 50:344
SYMPOSIUM ON TEACHER BARGAINING
and the reservation of management rights, there is further provision
for the protection of the interests served by collective bargaining and
the often conflicting interests served by local control of education. The
section 5 grandfather clause provides that, notwithstanding the enumer-
ation of items withdrawn from bargaining otherwise, "any items in-
cluded in the 1972-1973 agreements between any cmployer school cor-
poration and the employee organization shall continue to be bargain-
able."'
This language in itself fails to reveal the underlying policy the
legislature sought to effectuate and fails to give practical guidance to the
IEERB, or to teachers and school boards, in their attempt to comply
with the requirements of this provision. Whether a 1972-1973 agree-
ment even existed is perhaps the most difficult question.
Prior to 1973, collective negotiations in Indiana between school
corporations and teachers often culminated in agreements which
were not master contracts. While many negotiated agreements
contained all the formalities of contracts, others were oral, mem-
orialized solely by notation in the minutes of tie school board
meetings. Since § 5 grants bargaining rights far in excess of
those in § 4, the determination of eligibility under this provision
needs administrative or judicial clarification. 5
Another troublesome question that must be amwered is the mean-
ing of the language "any items" in the grandfather proviso. Does this
language limit the requirements of the grandfather clause to the
specific items that were actually included in the 1972-1973 contract,
or does it extend to include the general category of items of which the
specific item is but a part ?
CONCLUSION
Because this was the first year under the Act, many problems in
statutory interpretation arose, as was to be expected. However, before
rushing to open-scope bargaining, either to "clear up" scope questions or
to satisfy teacher organizations' desires, citizens generally and legisla-
tors in particular must keep in mind what the true significance of the
scope of bargaining dispute involves. Though there are competing
30 IND. CODE § 20-7.5-1-5 (1973), IND. ANN. STAT. § 284555 (Supp. 1974).
51 Note, supra note 6, at 465-66.
52 For a case dealing with certain other questions concerning the grandfather proviso,
see Dan Carter & Northwestern Corp. (Howard) Bd. of School Trustees, [Unfair
Practice] Case No. U-74-28-3470 (IEERB, Sept. 26, 1974). Bum see South Bend Com-
munity School Corp. & National Educ. Ass'n-South Bend, [Impasse Fact-Finding]
Case No. F-7431-7205 (IEERB, undated).
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values, "a narrow interpretation of the scope of bargaining and a broad
interpretation of rights reserved to management can best protect the
rights of citizens acting through their school boards." 8 Such an ap-
proach ensures that "questions of school policy which may also involve
considerations of political priority are to be answered at the polls rather
than at the bargaining table.""
It is possible that many of the current scope disputes will be re-
solved at the bargaining table. While Public Law 217 is a narrow-scope
bargaining law, a very comprehensive range of items, including many
section 5 permissive subjects and even a few items which are probably
"nonnegotiable," was actually included in the collective bargaining
agreements negotiated during the first year of teacher-school board
negotiations.55
The legislature should wait* until the next long session of the
General Assembly" before enacting any substantive changes in Public
Law 217. By 1977 teachers and school boards will have gained valuable
experience in the bargaining process, and the IEERB and courts will
have construed many of the Act's unclear provisions. This experience
will enable all parties concerned to judge the strengths and weaknesses
of the Act with a better perspective than would be possible after only
this first year of negotiations.
53 Id. at 468.
54 Id.
55 For a list of the items thus negotiated, and the frequency with which they ap-
peared in the 1974 contracts, see Appendix following. The list was compiled by Dr.
Max Shaw, Director of Personnel and Research Services of the Indiana School Boards
Ass'n, and by Mr. Lee Webb, doctoral student in education, Indiana University.
56 A "long" 61-day session is held every other year, with a "short" 30-day session in
intervening years. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2.1-1-2 (Code ed. Supp. 1974).
APPENDIX
Items Bargained in 1974
THE 140 MOST COMMON ITEMS FOUND IN 265 CONTRACTS BARGAINED
IN 1974, WITH FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE
Admission (free) to school Control items:
events .................... 19 Academic freedom ......... 17
Calendar ................... 103 Access to building ......... 2
Committees required ........ 36 Activity calendar provided... 1
Control bill ................. 14 Administrator evaluation by
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teachers ................ 1




Attendance at special meetings 1
Bell schedule to teachers .... 1
Class size ................ 20
Classroom interruptions .... 2





Dismissal of teachers ....... 33
Emergency school dosing... 3
Evaluation of teachers ..... 63
Faculty meetings .......... 59
Final exam schedule ....... 1
Grades and report cards .... 1
Hall duty ......... t........ 2
Home visitations .......... 1
I.R.S. statement for teachers 2
In-service meetings ........ 26
Instructional load .......... 29
Job security ............... 9
Leave building during day... 7
Legal representation for
teachers ................ 3
Lesson plans and objectives.. 2
Maintenance of standards... 24
Materials and supplies for in-
struction ............... 13
Noninstructional duties ..... 4
Nonprofessional employment 4
Observation requires consent 9
Parent complaint procedures 5
Parent conferences ........ 33
Preparation time .......... 47
Professional conduct ....... 2
Protection for teachers ..... 3
Psychometrist availability ... 1
Pupil assignment .......... 1
Safety glasses provided .... 1
Share contract printing costs 4
Special education .......... 1
Staff reduction ........... 14
Student teaching approval... 7
Substitutes hired when needed 12
Taking other classes (emer-
gency) ................. 21
Tardiness ................ 1
Teacher as 3ignment ........ 13
Teacher contract requirements 4
Teacher responsibility ...... 12
Teacher schedules ......... 1
Transfer ad promotion .... 45
Tuition fre, for teachers' chil-
dren ................... 2
Vacancies posted .......... 32
W-2 form, ................ 1
Days ...................... 137
Death benefit ................ 1
Discussion procedures ........ 60
Due process ................ 20
Dues deducticn .............. 172
Dues deductic n procedure ..... 123
Duration ................... 246




Cabinet/file for storage .... 2
Health and safety ......... 3
Lounge .................. 9
Maintenanc .............. 2
Moing grcss ............. 1
Parking .................. 2
Reference lbrary .......... 3
Special rooms during con-
struction ............... 1
Telephone iovailability ...... 6
Workroom and resources... 8
Fair practices ............... 27
Grievance pro,:edure:
Advisory arbitration.65 (24.5%o')
Binding arbitration.. 59 (22.3 % )
Board last level .... 77 (29.1%7)
Committee/panel last
level .............. 6 (2.3%)















Family illness ............. 90
Field trips ............... 3
Medical and dental ........ 1
Personal ................. 235
Religious holidays ......... 1
Sabbatical ................ 12
Sick ..................... 240
Staff development ......... 97








Exchange teaching ........ 5
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Paternity ................. 7
Peace Corps .............. 10
Pregnancy ................ 15
Public office .............. 47
Sabbatical .......... ; ..... 45
Study .................... 57
Summer school ............ 3
Travel ................... 7
Unrequested .............. 2
Management rights .......... 136
Medical requirements ........ 13
Negotiating procedures ....... 36
No lockout ................. 1
No strike .................. 54
Payroll deduction ............ 96
Payroll procedures .......... 53
Recognition ................. 246
Retirement/severance ........ 219
Salary guide ................ 265
B.S. +8.55% M.S. +9.20%
Scope ...................... 23
Severability ................. 184
Sick leave bank ............. 17
Substitute salary ............ 2
Summer school/night school... 32
Tenure changes ............. 5
Travel reimbursement ........ 131
W aiver .................... 153
